Delaware Court docket Of Chancery Permits Purchaser To Terminate Merger Due To Goal’s Failure To Function In The Odd Course; However Finds No MAE Due To COVID-19 – Coronavirus (COVID-19)

United States:

Delaware Court Of Chancery Permits Buyer To Terminate Merger Due To Target’s Failure To Operate In The Ordinary Course; But Finds No MAE Due To COVID-19

09 December 2020

Paul Weiss Rifkind Wharton & Garrison

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In 

AB Stable VIII LLC  MAPS Hotels and Resorts One

LLC, et al., the Delaware Court of Chancery held that the

COVID-19 pandemic did not result in a Material Adverse Effect

(“MAE”) on the target because pandemics fall within the

plain meaning of the MAE’s exception for “natural

disasters and calamities.” Nevertheless, the buyer was

excused from its obligation to close the transaction, and was

ultimately justified in terminating the sale agreement, because the

target had made significant changes to its business post-signing as

a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore violated its

covenant to operate its business in the ordinary course consistent

with past practices. Although the court, in an opinion by Vice

Chancellor J. Travis Laster, acknowledged that these changes were

“reasonable responses to the pandemic,” precedent and

the language of the ordinary course covenant required the court to

evaluate the target’s actions exclusively based on how it had

operated in the past, and not whether they were reasonable in view

of the pandemic. According to the court, management cannot

“take extraordinary actions and claim that they are ordinary

under the circumstances.” Although this decision was

dependent on the specific contractual language at hand, the

court’s interpretation of MAE and ordinary course covenants

generally deserves the attention of M&A parties and

practitioners.

In September 2019, an affiliate of Mirae Asset Financial Group

(the “Buyer”) agreed to acquire from the seller, an

affiliate of a Chinese insurance and financial services

conglomerate (the “Seller”), a luxury hotel business

(the “target”). On the scheduled closing date in April

2020, the Buyer asserted that it was not obligated to close because

the Seller had made a number of inaccurate representations and

warranties and failed to comply with covenants under the relevant

sale agreement and that it could (and ultimately did) terminate the

agreement if the breaches remained uncured.

The Court of Chancery made the following key holdings addressing

these claims:

  • The COVID-19 pandemic did not result in an MAE on the

    target because the pandemic fell within an exception to the

    definition for effects resulting from “natural disasters and

    calamities.” The court found support for this

    conclusion in the plain meaning of the term

    “calamities” and the structure of the MAE definition in

    the sale agreement (e.g., its generally Seller-friendly

    nature and allocation of systematic risk to the Buyer).
  • Nevertheless, the Buyer was not obligated to close the

    transaction because the target made significant changes to its

    business post-signing as a result of the pandemic, and therefore

    the Seller breached its covenant to operate target’s business

    in the ordinary course, consistent with past practice in all

    material respects. After the onset of COVID-19, the target

    temporarily closed two of its hotels due to very low demand and

    governmental orders (with one closing in advance of its normal

    seasonal schedule and the other being unprecedented), operated its

    other hotels with significantly reduced staff and amenities and

    paused all non-essential capital spending. The court’s

    rationale for concluding that these changes violated the ordinary

    course covenant, which in turn supplied the predicate for the

    Buyer’s right to terminate the sale agreement, included the

    following:
    • Although the court acknowledged that these changes “were

      reasonable responses to the pandemic,” it wrote that

      precedent “does not suggest that when faced with an

      extraordinary event, management may take extraordinary actions and

      claim that they are ordinary under the circumstances,” and

      “does not support reading (the Seller’s ordinary course

      covenant) to permit management to do whatever hotel companies

      ordinarily would do when facing a global pandemic.” Instead,

      the court held that precedent dictated a comparison of the

      company’s actions with how the company has routinely operated

      and that the target breached the ordinary course covenant by

      departing significantly from that routine.
    • The phrasing of the ordinary course covenant—that it

      conduct its business “only  in the ordinary

      course of business, consistent with past

      practices” (emphasis added)—created a standard

      that looked exclusively at how the target has operated in the past.

      If the parties had wanted an alternative result, the parties could

      have drafted the provision otherwise. For example, the court

      suggested that excluding the phrase “consistent with past

      practices” would have permitted it also to examine practices

      at comparable companies to determine what constituted

      “ordinary course.”
    • The Seller also argued that the target could change its

      business so long as such changes did not constitute an MAE because

      any other interpretation would negate the otherwise carefully

      negotiated risk allocation of the MAE provision. However, the court

      was not persuaded by this argument because the ordinary course

      covenant was drafted with a standard of “all material

      respects” and not by reference to an MAE.
    • Because the issues were not adequately briefed, the court

      declined to rule on Seller’s argument that it did not breach

      the ordinary course covenant because it was required to deviate

      from the ordinary course to comply with governmental orders imposed

      in view of the pandemic and certain other covenants in the sale

      agreement. The court did acknowledge, however, that there were

      “credible and contestable contractual, conceptual, and

      policy-based arguments” to support both Buyer and Seller.

      Notably, however, the ordinary course covenant did not include an

      express exception for actions required by law, so the

      target’s compliance with governmental orders did not affect

      the court’s contractual interpretation of the

      provision’s literal terms.
  • Seller’s failure to satisfy the title insurance

    closing condition provided an additional basis for excusing the

    Buyer’s obligation to close. The sale agreement

    contained a closing condition that required the Seller to obtain

    documentation (i) removing fraudulent deeds recorded on certain of

    the hotels being sold from public record and (ii) enabling the

    Buyer to obtain title insurance that either did not contain an

    exception from coverage for the fraudulent deeds or that included

    such an exception, but affirmatively provided coverage through an

    endorsement. As part of a complex series of events described at

    length in the opinion, a career criminal recorded the

    aforementioned fraudulent deeds, and the company engaged in

    litigation that ultimately led to the deeds’ expungement.

    Despite this outcome, the title insurers refused to issue title

    commitments without certain broad exceptions that encompassed the

    fraudulent deeds, and therefore, the title insurance closing

    condition failed. The court rejected the Seller’s arguments

    that the Buyer caused the failure of the title insurance condition

    by breaching a performance obligation. Therefore, the failure of

    the condition provided an additional basis excusing Buyer’s

    obligation to close the transaction.

Takeaways

The AB Stable  opinion provides several

important considerations for MAE provisions, ordinary course

covenants and related conditions and covenants in M&A

agreements.

  • When analyzing MAE provisions, Delaware courts generally

    operate from the baseline assumption that business risk is

    allocated to the seller and systematic risk to the buyer. Thus,

    deviation from this assumption should be clear. Similarly, the lack

    of common aspects of an MAE provision could be interpreted by the

    court as indicative of intentional risk allocation by the parties.

    Here, because the MAE definition lacked certain typical features

    generally regarded as buyer friendly, the court viewed their

    omission as intentional and interpreted the MAE provision’s

    other terms—specifically, the meaning of

    “calamities” the parties must have intended—in a

    more seller-friendly manner.
  • When interpreting MAE provisions, Delaware courts will default

    to a term’s plain meaning, which could result in a broader

    interpretation of the term. Here, for example, the court relied on

    the plain meaning of “calamities” and declined to

    narrow its meaning by relation to “natural disaster”

    even though they were in the same MAE clause.
  • In discussing ordinary course covenants, the AB

    Stable  court did not address whether contracts entered

    into after the COVID-19 pandemic began should be interpreted so

    that “ordinary course consistent with past practice”

    includes actions taken during the pandemic. Parties should consider

    whether extraordinary, pandemic-related actions are “ordinary

    course” and draft their agreements accordingly. For example,

    in view of this uncertainty, sellers may want to add language

    clarifying that “ordinary course” includes actions

    during the pandemic or other industry practices in responding to

    material events or changes in circumstances. Likewise, if a court

    might interpret “ordinary course consistent with past

    practice” to include all reasonable responses to past

    extraordinary events, buyers may want to consider whether that

    language provides sellers with too much leeway and negotiate for

    narrower or more limiting language, such as that only actions that

    were required by law or regulation should be interpreted as

    “ordinary” for this purpose.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general

guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought

about your specific circumstances.

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