Chapter And IRC Part 4980H – Insolvency/Chapter/Re-structuring

The recent bankruptcy case of In re Creative

Hairdressers, Inc. et al,  Case Nos. 20-14583 and

20-14584 (jointly administered) (Bankr. D. Md., March 3, 2022)

involved the intersection of IRC section 4980H’s employer shared responsibility

payment and bankruptcy law.

Bankruptcy and Section 4980H’s Employer Shared

Responsibility Payment

This case addresses an interesting intersection of tax and bankruptcy law.  Specifically, it

looks at the bankruptcy court’s treatment of claims made by the

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under §4980H of the Internal

Revenue Code.  The specific issue addressed is whether or not

such claim is entitled to priority status as an excise tax under

§507(a)(8)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code.  Ultimately, the

Court concluded that it is entitled to such priority status to the

extent that such claim related to any payments required under the

statute arising within three years from the petition date.

Section 4980H was added to the Internal Revenue Code by

the Affordable Care

Act (“ACA“), enacted on March

30, 2010.  Section 4980H applies to applicable “large

employers” (generally, employers who employ at least 50

full-time employees, including full-time equivalent employees, on

business days during the preceding calendar year).  Section

4980H generally provides that an applicable large employer is

subject to an assessable payment if either (1) §4980H(a)

applies because the employer fails to offer its full-time employees

(and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage under an

eligible employer-sponsored plan and any full-time employee is

certified to receive a premium tax credit or cost-sharing

reduction; or (2) § 4980H(b) applies because the employer

offers its full-time employees (and their dependents) the

opportunity to enroll in minimum essential coverage and one or more

full-time employees is certified to receive a premium tax credit or

cost-sharing reduction.

In this case, the IRS asserted a priority claim against the

Debtors for the employer shared responsibility

payment (“ESRP“) under

§4980H.  Specifically, the IRS sought priority status as

an excise tax under 11 U.S.C. §507(a)(8)(E).  The Debtors

objected, contending the ESRP is not an excise tax entitled to

priority treatment, but is a nonpriority penalty. The parties also

disputed when the “transaction occur(red)” that gave rise

to the ESRP, as that phrase is used in 11 U.S.C.

§507(a)(8)(E)(ii).

The Debtor was partially self-insured as defined by the ACA.

 The Debtors qualified as an Applicable Large Employer under the ACA.

 The Debtors offered minimum essential health insurance

coverage to at least 95% of their employees, but some employees

were allowed a tax credit or cost-sharing reduction for any of the

following reasons: (a) the coverage did not provide minimum value;

(b) the coverage was not affordable; or (c) the employee was not

offered coverage. Under the ACA, if an employee receives a tax

credit or cost-sharing reduction, then the IRS may charge the

employer a shared responsibility payment under §4980H.

For the tax period ending December 31, 2016, the IRS charged the

Debtors an ESRP for the employees that were allowed a tax credit or

cost-sharing reduction under the ACA. For each month from January

2016 through November 2016, over 450 of the Debtors’ full-time

employees were enrolled in a qualified health plan for which they

were allowed a tax credit or cost-sharing reduction. On December

19, 2018, the IRS sent the Debtors a Letter 226-J with a proposed

ESRP of $818,640.00 for tax year 2016, noting liability was

applicable under 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(b). Ultimately, the amount

was reduced to $778,050.00.

Beginning in 2017, the Debtors did not offer a health plan

offering minimum essential coverage to salon

employees. As a result, CHI accrued ESRP charges for 2017 and 2018.

For each month of tax year 2017, over 350 of CHI’s full-time

employees were allowed a tax credit or cost-sharing reduction by

the IRS.  On October 3, 2019, the IRS sent the Debtors a

Letter 226-J certifying that one or more employees were allowed a

tax credit and proposing an ESRP of approximately $13,901,259.96,

but later reduced to $1,311,930.00 upon a showing that the Debtors

had offered minimum essential coverage to at least 95% of their

full-time employees and their dependents.

Bankruptcy and the IRS’s Proof of Claim

The Debtors filed for bankruptcy in 2020.  The IRS filed a

Proof of Claim against the Debtors asserting a liability of

$2,094,029.28 and asserting priority status under

§507(a)(8)(E).  In the Form 410 Summary, the IRS

identified the tax as an “Excise” tax for the relevant

periods.

The Court looked at two issues in relation to the IRS claims, as

follows:

  1. Whether  the ESRP was an excise tax entitled to priority

    under §507(a)(8)(E) of the Bankruptcy Code; and
  2. if the ESRP was an excise tax, whether the amounts claimed by

    the IRS for 2016 and 2017 taxes were “on a transaction

    occurring within three years of the petition” as required by

    §507(a)(8)(E).

The Bankruptcy Code grants priority status to certain allowed

claims. Section 507(a)(8) grants priority to “excise”

taxes:

((8))  Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental

units, only to the extent that such claims are for—

****

((E))  an excise tax on—

((i))  a transaction occurring before the date of the

filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last

due, under applicable law or under any extension, after three years

before the date of the filing of the petition; or

((ii))  if a return is not required, a transaction

occurring during the three years immediately preceding the date of

the filing of the petition.

Section 507(a)(8)(E).

Is the ESRP an Excise Tax?

The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “excise

tax.” In United States v. Reorganized CF & I

Fabricators of Utah,

Inc.(“CF&I“), 518 U.S. 213, 224

(1996), the U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether an exaction was an

excise tax entitled to priority under the statutory predecessor to

§507(a)(8)(E) or a nonpriority penalty. The IRS asserted a

claim against the debtor CF&I Steel Corporation for fees

assessed for failing to make annual minimum funding contributions

to a pension plan, as provided in 26 U.S.C. §§4971(a).

Under §4971(a), an employer that failed to make its required

contribution was assessed a tax of 10% on the accumulated funding

deficiency. The debtor failed to pay $12.4 million of the required

contribution into its pension plans for the tax year prior to

filing bankruptcy. The amount due under 26 U.S.C.

§§4971(a) was approximately $1.24 million.  The IRS

similarly sought priority status for the exaction as an excise

tax.  The bankruptcy court allowed the claim, but determined

it was a noncompensatory penalty, not an excise tax, and denied

priority. The district court and the Court of Appeals for the 10th

Circuit affirmed.

In affirming, the Supreme Court focused on the

operation—not the label—of the provision establishing

the liability. CF&I, 518 U.S. at 224. It

concluded that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which codified priority

to several types of taxes, “reveals no congressional intent to

reject generally the interpretive principle that characterizations

in the Internal Revenue Code are not dispositive in the bankruptcy

context, and no specific provision that would relieve us from

making a functional examination of §

4971(a).” Id. The Court noted that a

functional examination is supported by a long history of precedent

in determining whether a tax is an “excise tax” for

bankruptcy priority purposes. Id. ; see

United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1931)

(a “tax” and a “penalty” “are not

interchangeable one for the other. No mere exercise of the art of

lexicography can alter the essential nature of an act or a thing;

and if an exaction be clearly a penalty it cannot be converted into

a tax by the simple expedient of calling it

such.”); City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U.S.

283, 285 (1941) (determining whether a “tax” was entitled

to priority treatment under §64 of the Bankruptcy Act of

1938); United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510,

514-17 (1942) (relying on its decision

in Feiring which examined the effect of the

exaction).

The Court stated that “a tax is an enforced contribution to

provide for the support of government; a penalty, as the word is

here used, is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an

unlawful act.” CF&I, 518 U.S. at 224 (citing

to La Franca, 282 U.S. at 571-72). The Court

concluded that the pension provision at issue was obviously penal

in nature. The 10% exaction was not created to support the

government. The legislative committee reports stated that the

previous statutory penalties did not incentivize employers to fully

fund their plans. Id. at 226. Instead, the new

provision would penalize employers directly by requiring them not

only to fund the deficiency but also pay the 10%

exaction. Id. The Court highlighted that the 10%

excise was in addition to the Pension Benefit Guaranty

Corporation’s independent claim to the total amount of the

pension contribution deficiency. Thus, the pension provision had a

primarily punitive aim versus a goal to support the government.

The Supreme Court affirmed the use of this “functional

approach” analysis of an exaction in Nat’l

Fed’n of Independ. Bus. v. Sebelius

(“NFIB”), 567 U.S. 519 (2012), which addressed

whether the individual shared responsibility payment of the ACA

passed Constitutional muster under the Taxing Clause.  At the

time of the decision, the individual mandate required most

Americans to maintain minimum essential health insurance coverage.

Under the ACA, if an individual did not maintain minimum essential

health insurance coverage, then the individual was required to make

a shared responsibility payment to the IRS with their taxes and it

was collected like a tax penalty.

After NFIB, many courts grappled with the question

of whether the individual mandate was an excise tax under

§507(a)(8)(E), with differing results.  The Court here

focused on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Liberty

Univ., Inc. v. Lew (“Liberty”), 733 F.3d 72

(4th Cir. 2013).   The Court

in Liberty  relied on the Supreme Court’s

analysis in NFIB to determine that ESRP is a tax

under the “Taxing and Spending or General Welfare

Clause.” Liberty , 733 F.3d at 95-96. The

Fourth Circuit applied the “functional approach” and

concluded that the ESRP functioned as a tax and not a

penalty.  Turning to the case at bar, the Maryland Bankruptcy

Court ultimately concluded that the employer shared responsibility

payment is an excise tax entitled to priority.

Does the IRS have Priority?

Turning to the second issue, the Court noted that finding that

the ESRP was an excise tax did not end the inquiry.  Section

507(a)(8)(E) provides that allowed unsecured government claims are

entitled to priority only to the extent such claims are for an

excise tax on “a transaction occurring during the three years

immediately preceding the petition date.” §507(a)(8)(E).

The parties disputed whether there was a “transaction”

that imposed the ESRP and, if so, when the transaction

“occur(ed)” under the ACA.  The Court determined

that it is the underinsured or uninsured employee’s act of

enrolling in a qualified health plan that triggers the ESRP, and

therefore concluded that the “transaction occur(s)” under

§507(a)(8)(E) when an employee who is not offered the minimum

level of insurance coverage and who meets certain financial

standards enrolls in a qualified health plan.

Ultimately, the Court determined that, based on the petition

date of April 23, 2020, the three-year period of §507(a)(8)(E)

began on April 23, 2017.  Any ESRP amounts arising from

employee enrollments in a qualified plan prior to that date were

excluded from priority, and would be deemed general unsecured

claims.  Therefore, the court granted in part and denied in

part the Debtors’ objection to the IRS claim.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general

guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought

about your specific circumstances.